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Internal audit department characteristics/activities and audit fees: 
Some evidence from Hong Kong firms  
 
  
Abstract 
 
This study provides preliminary support for the notion that internal audit function 
assists in reducing external audit effort and fees.  Data on internal audit characteristics 
and activities are obtained from survey respondents of Hong Kong companies and 
audit fee model data are acquired from their annual reports.  The results of this study 
suggest that the external auditor of firms in Hong Kong rely on the internal audit 
function and subsequently charge a lower fee. Lower external audit fees are 
associated with a larger internal audit department and certain activities carried out by 
the internal audit. Specifically, lower external audit fees are associated with more 
internal audit effort spent on activities relating to financial statements, systems 
development and maintenance, operating efficiency and effectiveness, fraud 
investigations and unlimited access to internal auditors’ working papers.  The results 
of this study suggest that the contribution of the internal audit may substitute for some 
substantive external auditing processes and lower monitoring costs. 
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1. Introduction 
An increasing number of earnings restatements along with allegations of financial 
statement fraud committed by high profile companies have eroded public confidence 
in corporate governance, the financial reporting process, and audit functions.  
Subsequently, firms’ internal control environment, a vital part of corporate 
governance, is under scrutiny.  Internal audit is an independent appraisal and 
monitoring function established within a firm to examine and evaluate the firm’s 
activities. This independent review is part of the internal control structure of the firm. 
Thus, it is likely that the characteristics of the internal audit department and 
effectiveness of the various activities of the internal audit department may have a 
bearing on the auditors’ assessment of internal control risk and hence audit effort and 
audit fees.  
 
This study examines the linkages between various internal audit (IA) characteristics 
and activities of Hong Kong firms and external audit fees. While the majority of 
research on the link between the internal audit and external audit fees has been 
conducted in the U.S., there is little evidence from different environments. With the 
globalization of auditing standards (including internal auditing), it is important that 
evidence from different jurisdictions is available to improve our understanding of the 
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importance and role of IA.  Research based on US firms may not be applicable to 
Hong Kong firms as business and institutional environments as well as ownership 
structure of firms from Hong Kong differ from those of the U.S. firms (Jaggi & Leung 
2007).  Unlike western firms where agency conflicts arise because ownership is 
separated from control due to disperse ownership (Type I agency costs), Hong Kong 
firms are characterized by dominant ownership and agency costs arise because 
resources are diverted from the minority shareholders. One or several family members 
tightly hold shares in a typical Asian corporation (Claessens & Fan 2002). As a result 
of family domination, the agency problem shifts from the manager-shareholder 
conflict to majority-minority shareholder conflict (Type II agency cost)1.  In family 
owned and controlled firms, there will be great potential for manager-owners to 
expropriate the interests of minority shareholders (Claessens & Fan 2002).  The 
necessity for auditing controls is based on the assumption that individuals will 
withhold valuable information and act opportunistically in the absence of monitoring 
controls.  This assumption may also be sensitive to the institutional and cultural 
setting.  Consequently, the research question addressed in this paper is: What is the 
role of internal audit in substituting for external audit in the mitigation of Type II 
agency problems? 
                                                 
1 Refer to Anderson & Reeb (2004) and Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan (2007) for a discussion on Type I 
and Type II agency problems. 
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Our motivation for examining this issue is as follows. First, there is increasing 
emphasis in the profession and academia on the role of the internal audit as part of the 
firm’s corporate governance. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), for example, 
states that internal auditing can bring a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate 
and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes 
(IIA 2005). In addition, professional auditing standards recommend that the internal 
auditing department should work closely with the external auditor.  The Hong Kong 
standard on Auditing (HKSA) 610 (HKICPA 2005) explicitly states that the “external 
auditor should consider the activities of internal auditing and their effect, if any, on 
external audit procedures” (HKSA 610, para 2). The same standard also draws 
attention to the fact that effective internal auditing will allow a modification in the 
nature and timing and a reduction in the extent of audit procedures performed by the 
external auditor (HKSA 610, para 10).  By studying the relationship between certain 
IA characteristics and activities and external audit fees, this paper sheds some light on 
whether there is a linkage between IA and the auditors’ effort as envisaged in HKSA 
610.   
 
Furthermore, the relationship between the external auditors and the IA may be 
associated with cultural characteristics.  For example, Kachelmeier & Shehata (1997) 
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suggest that collective values motivate cooperative efforts within the firm, so that 
divisions (such as the internal audit) voluntarily reveal private information for the 
firm's benefit (p.411).  Kachelmeier & Shehata (1997) purport that Hong Kong and 
the People’s Republic of China participants (collectivists) are more likely to reveal 
private information about internal auditing than Canadian participants (individualists). 
 
Subsequent to the Asian financial crisis, the audit function is important for Hong 
Kong firms striving to increase the perception of better governance practices. To 
maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre, Hong Kong firms 
purport to follow corporate governance standards and quality of financial disclosures 
corresponding to international best practice (Jaggi & Leung 2007).  It is in this setting 
that we explore whether external auditors place greater reliance on the activities 
performed by the internal auditors and subsequently charge lower fees. 
 
Finally, the link between internal auditing and external audit fees has been discussed 
in the literature (Whittington & Winters 1990).  However, the few studies that directly 
examine the association between external audit fees and internal audit characteristics 
and activities have mixed results.  Some studies show that internal audit activities are 
associated with a reduction in external audit fees (see for example, Elliott & Korpi 
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1978; Felix, Gramling, & Maletta 2001; Gramling 1999; Wallace 1984).  Other 
studies find that IA assistance is not a significant determinant of external audit fees for 
either financial services clients or industrial firm clients (Stein, Simunic, & O’Keefe 
1994). In contrast, further research finds a positive association between the internal 
audit budget (Carcello, Hermanson, & Raghunandan 2005) and the use of an internal 
audit (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006a) and audit fees.  The inconsistent results of 
prior research suggest that there is room for more research on the linkages between 
internal auditors’ characteristics/activities and external audit effort.  
 
The sample consists of 53 observations of firms that responded to a survey on internal 
audit characteristics and activities for the financial year 2004.  Data for the audit fee 
models are obtained from the firm’s annual reports.  The IA characteristics we 
examine are the relative size of internal audit department and the qualification of 
internal audit staff. The IA activities we examine cover the efforts spent by internal 
auditors on the following: financial statements and external audit related matters; 
systems development and maintenance; operating efficiency and effectiveness 
including internal controls; fraud investigations and other special projects; and 
compliance with company policies, procedures and statutory requirements. Finally we 
also assess the extent of external auditors’ unlimited access to internal auditors’ 
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working papers. 
 
We find that the following firm characteristics and IA activities are associated with 
lower external audit fees: (1) larger internal audit departments, (2) internal auditors 
who spend more time on examining financial statements and external audit related 
matters, (3) internal auditors who spend more time on systems development and 
maintenance, (4) internal auditors who spend more time on reviewing operating 
efficiency and effectiveness including internal controls, (5) internal auditors who 
spend more time on fraud investigations and special projects,  and (6) internal auditors 
who give external auditors’ more access to internal auditors’ working papers.  
 
This paper contributes to the internal auditing literature in the following ways. First, 
the study provides evidence that internal auditing characteristics/activities affect 
external audit fees in Hong Kong firms. Second, we find firms with internal auditing 
function having better accounting information disclosure.  Third, unlike prior studies 
such as Felix et al. (2001) that consider the external auditors assessment of the 
internal auditors’ contribution to the audit process, we determine the internal auditors’ 
contribution by surveying companies with internal audit units. In this way we provide 
a stronger research setting. Further, our audit fee data are obtained from the annual 
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reports of the surveyed firms, thus employing a unique data set.  
 
2. Background and development of propositions 
Carey, Simnett, & Tanewski (2000) suggest that there may be several factors that 
increase demand for auditing in the family dominated firms such as in Hong Kong. 
First, dominant shareholders might delegate some level of management 
responsibilities to management. This will increase information asymmetry between 
dominant owners and management and the demand for auditing increases due to 
higher Type I agency costs. Second, the demand for auditing increases as firms raise 
capital from outside investors.  Ownership concentration creates Type II agency 
conflict because the dominant owners have incentives to divert resources for their 
personal use which in turn restricts resource flow to minority shareholders. The 
demand for monitoring increases with the proportion of minority ownership and 
director representation.   
 
Agency theory suggests that the internal audit function is a means of reducing the 
monitoring costs of the statutory audit while signaling to the minority owners that the 
audit coverage is not diminished (Adams, 1994).  Managers incur bonding costs, such 
as the cost of internal audit, to signal to minority owners that they are acting 
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responsibly.  Moreover, the internal audit helps owners overcome some information 
asymmetry problems and monitor manager’s activities cost-effectively (Adams 1994).  
Subsequently the internal audit, along with the external audit, helps to maintain cost-
efficient contracting between owners and managers.   Sherer & Kent (1983) argue that 
internal audit is an adjunct of external audit function.  Since internal auditors have 
specific industry knowledge and expertise in systems and operational audits, the total 
cost of internal and external audit may be less than the perceived cost of external 
auditing on its own.  
 
2.1.  Internal audit and external audit fees  
Jensen and Payne (2003) suggest that firms establish and maintain control systems to 
reduce the costs associated with poor decisions (e.g., poor performance evaluations, 
missed investment opportunities), as well as the costs associated with information risk 
in general (e.g., cost of capital, government oversight).  Thus, a firm with poor control 
systems is likely to incur greater costs of capital and equity or lower equity values.  To 
mitigate these costs, it is common for organizations to establish an internal auditing 
function, which serves as a part of the internal control system, to help management 
establish internal controls, review and monitor their operations and effectiveness.   
Ordinarily, apart from review of internal controls and review of economy, efficiency 
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and effectiveness of operations, internal auditing activities also include the 
examination of financial and operating information, which may include detailed 
testing of financial transactions, accounting balances and procedures (HKSA 610).  
Therefore external auditors may find certain parts of the internal auditing work useful 
and relevant and hence are able to reduce their own work. 
 
Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan (2007: 242) identify factors that contribute towards 
mitigating Type II agency problems. Concentrated equity holdings provide dominant 
shareholders with substantial control as their voting rights exceeding their cash flow 
rights and the power to seek private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. 
However, when families engage in private rent seeking, their activities may be 
revealed to the market which in turn lowers the value of their lower equity. 
Consequently, in line with the bonding argument, we suggest that minority 
shareholders anticipate the expropriation by the insiders and therefore withhold 
capital (increasing the cost of equity and/or the cost of debt) unless the firm provides 
strong signals that expropriation is contained. One way of providing such a signal is 
to employ a high quality auditor who will not allow the management of earnings to 
hide private control benefit consumption (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki 2003). Another 
related signal is to have a strong and visible internal audit function that inhibits 
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expropriation of resources at the middle and lower managerial levels. A combination 
of strong external auditor and a strong and visible internal audit function is therefore a 
signal that will reduce the perception of potential misappropriation by the insiders. To 
the extent that a strong internal audit function creates a good internal control system 
and provides a signal that the insiders are not expropriating the resources of the firm, 
a substitutive relationship can be hypothesized for certain audit areas for which the 
external auditors can rely on the work on internal auditors. 
 
Internal auditors can contribute to the financial statement audit by either assisting the 
external auditors or by performing the relevant work throughout the audit year.  The 
internal auditors’ participation in the external audit is similar to the vertical integration 
or outsourcing decision (Morrill & Morrill 2003).  Audit services can be purchased 
from within or outside the firm and the optimal mix depends on the costs associated 
with each of the available sources. Transaction cost economics explains that the 
variation is primarily due to reducing the transaction costs of conducting the activity.  
Subsequently, reliance on internal audit work can reduce the evidence collected 
directly by the external auditors, which decreases external audit fees, thus reducing 
overall monitoring costs.  The cost of an internal audit is incurred directly by the firm 
and owners have an incentive to incur the costs of internal audit if the total cost of the 
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audit process, both internal and external, is less than the perceived cost of external 
auditing on its own. These associations may be associated with the institutional and 
cultural setting of the firm. 
 
Carey et al. (2000) find that voluntary demand for internal audit is more prevalent 
than the demand for external audit for family dominated Australian firms2.  They find 
that the demand for external audit is function of firm debt and the proportion of 
nonfamily management and nonfamily directors as a consequence of Type 1 agency 
costs.  The negative correlation they find between the external audit and the IA 
suggests that they are substitute monitoring mechanisms. 
 
2.2. Internal audit contribution to the external audit  
Given the inconsistent results of prior research on the linkage between internal 
auditing and external audit fees, it is appropriate to consider the factors likely to be 
associated with internal auditors’ contribution to the external audit. Prior research on 
external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function was mainly conducted before 
recent changes in the audit environment brought about by the recent corporate 
collapses.  Research carried out before 2003 fails to account for the impact of 
                                                 
2This study was carried out in a period when neither was a statutory requirement. 
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legislation such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US and the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, also 
known as CLERP 9 in Australia.  In January 2004, the Hong Kong Exchange and 
Clearing Ltd issued its draft Code on Corporate Governance Practices (the Code), 
which became effective for accounting periods commencing January 1, 2005.   Since 
then, listed companies in Hong Kong are expected to comply with the Code to 
conduct a review of the effectiveness of the internal control system, including 
financial, operational and compliance controls and risk management functions.   
Listed firms are also required to include a report on corporate governance practices in 
their summary financial reports and annual reports.   Although the relevant changes 
have not yet become compulsory for firms in our sample period, they suggest that 
other criteria (e.g. internal control knowledge, systems development, and fraud 
investigations) might be important in assessing IA contribution to the audit process 
and consequently audit fees. 
 
Although internal auditors perform many tasks that are unrelated to organizations' 
accounting information systems, many of their responsibilities are linked directly to 
the production and monitoring of accounting information (Moeller & Witt 1998). One 
of the primary responsibilities of internal auditors is to test, evaluate, and make 
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recommendations regarding an organization's accounting system and its internal 
accounting controls. Consequently, internal auditors reduce the risk of fraud and 
protect assets from theft or loss. External auditors generally perform similar activities 
with similar benefits and may substitute these activities if they can rely on the IA.   
 
There has been considerable research investigating the association between the 
internal and external audits.  Using mainly survey and experimental research methods 
(e.g. DeZoort, Houston, & Peters 2001; Gramling 1999), this area of research 
typically posits external auditors’ reliance on the IA based on external auditors’ 
evaluation of internal audit quality in terms of the three quality factors of competence, 
objectivity, and quality of work performance.  Krishnamoorthy (2002) notes that even 
though the relative importance of these three factors differs between studies, they find 
generally that all three have an important impact on external auditor reliance on the 
internal audit (e.g. Maletta & Kida 1993; Margheim 1986; Tiessen & Colson 1990).   
 
Auditing standard SAS No. 65 (AICPA 1991) describes the IA quality characteristics 
of competence (e.g. educational level, certification) and quality of work performance 
(e.g. adequacy of audit programs, scope of work performed).  Similarly, the Hong 
Kong Standard on Auditing 610 (HKICPA 2005) requires external auditors to assess 
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the IA function in terms of organizational status, scope of function, technical 
competence and due professional care. We suggest that internal auditors’ contribution 
to the external audit can be assessed based on quality factors such as IA staff size, 
qualifications (competence), and nature and quality of their work done.  Subsequently, 
we can test the magnitude of IA contribution to the external audit by testing the 
association between the quality factors and external audit fees.  Margheim (1986) 
finds competence and work performance have significant effect on budgeted external 
audit hours, that is, external auditors place greater reliance on IA work at a higher 
level of IA competence and work performance.   
 
2.3. Internal audit characteristics 
Prior research (e.g. Messier & Schneider 1988) suggests that the external auditor 
places greater reliance on the internal audit when the IA has the attributes associated 
with competence (e.g. criterion related to competence may be the percentage of 
professionally certified internal auditors).  Previous research on auditors’ assessment 
of the criteria of IA competence includes: IA training programs, with an emphasis on 
professional certifications (Brown 1983), and IA experience (Messier & Schneider 
1988).  Other research has surveyed the IA, external auditor, CFO and audit 
committee, and found the Certified Internal Auditor designation (Myers & Gramling 
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1997) or educational background of the IA (Reinstein, Lander, & Gavin 1994) as the 
most important criterion of competence.  The results of prior research suggest that the 
external auditor places greater reliance on IA with accounting/auditing qualifications 
and also finds that firms with IA are more likely to detect or deter financial statement 
fraud (e.g. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides 2000; KPMG Peat Marwick 
1999). We expect that IA departments with more staff with professional accounting or 
auditing qualifications are likely to be associated with lower audit fees. An IA with 
qualified staff means the external auditor is able to place more reliance on the IA’s 
ability to detect errors and omissions.   
 
Research finds that the size of the IA is associated with many factors.  Carcello et al. 
(2005) find that internal audit budgets are positively related to company size, leverage, 
industry, relative amount of inventory, operating cash flows, and audit committee 
review of the internal audit budget.  Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2006b) suggest that 
the size of the internal audit function is associated with risk management, internal 
control and corporate governance.  They find that larger IA is associated with larger 
firms, reduced reliance on Big5 (now Big4) auditors and more frequent audit 
committee meetings (a more diligent audit function).  Further, Al-Twaijry, Brierley, & 
Gwilliam (2004) find that external auditors express concern about the independence, 
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scope of work and small size of many internal audit departments. They also find that 
the extent of reliance by the external auditor on the work of the internal auditor varies 
with the quality of the internal audit department.  Taken together, this research 
suggests that the size of the IA may be a contributing factor to the external auditor’s 
reliance on the IA, which will influence the audit fee.  
 
Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2006b) find, in a study of Australian firms, that the number 
of employees in the IA is positively associated with external audit fees, suggesting 
that larger IA demands more substantive external audit testing.  However, the 
significant results disappeared after scaling for size, suggesting that the association is 
due to client size rather that IA size.   We expect that larger IA departments, relative to 
the size of the firm, are associated with lower external audit fees.  The argument 
follows that the larger the size of the IA, the more resources available to the IA 
creating greater competence and more likelihood of detecting errors and omissions.  
In addition, the collectivist nature of Hong Kong firms means that IA is more likely to 
reveal private information to the external auditor thus reducing external audit testing3.  
The firm incurs bonding costs from increasing the size of the IA while reducing 
                                                 
3 In an individualistic culture with greater information asymmetry, the internal auditors may, acting in 
their own self-interest, prefer to keep private information to preserve their anonymity. Subsequently the 
external auditor does not rely on the IA as a substitute for external audit tasks. 
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expenditure on the external audit.   
The preceding discussion leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1(a): There is a negative association between external audit fees and 
the proportion of professionally qualified accountants in the 
IA department.  
Proposition 1(b): There is a negative association between external audit fees and 
the size of the IA department.  
 
2.4. Internal audit activities 
Due to an increasing number of earnings restatements and allegations of financial 
statement fraud committed by high profile companies4, the IA has greater internal 
control responsibilities.  The importance of IA work is demonstrated by prior research 
investigating IA effectiveness in ensuring the reliability of financial reporting.  This 
area of research finds that fraud firms have less internal audit support than non-fraud 
firms (Beasley et al. 2000) and that internal auditors are more likely to discover fraud 
than external auditors (KPMG Peat Marwick 1999).  Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, & 
Church (2004) suggest that we need to understand how the internal audit function 
interacts with the external auditors to achieve quality corporate governance.  Clark, 
Gibbs, & Schroeder (1980) find that internal auditors' knowledge of company 
                                                 
4 Examples include Enron and World Corp in the U.S., HIH and OneTel in Australia, and Palamat in 
Italy. 
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operations, processes, and procedures is the most important criterion.  It is suggested 
in this study that the external auditor places reliance on the work performed by the IA 
and access to that work means less audit effort.   
 
Previous research has found that external auditors’ assessment of IA work 
performance is the most important factor in determining IA quality (e.g. Brown & 
Karan 1986; Schneider 1985).  Experimental and archival/survey research (e.g. Felix 
et al. 2001; Gramling 1999; Maletta & Kida 1993) suggests that budgeted external 
audit hours decrease with increased reliance on IA work.  Furthermore, internal 
auditing is designed to add value and improve the organizations operations by 
assisting organizations achieve their goals through evaluating and improving the 
effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes (Carcello et al. 
2005).   Consequently, the external auditor places greater reliance on the contribution 
of the IA on work that extends beyond examining financial statements and external 
audit related matters.  The survey of Cooper, Leung, & Chau (1989) of CEOs in Hong 
Kong provides evidence that the role of IA extends beyond financial statement audit.  
They find that the majority of CEOs perceive the main role of internal audit as: 
independent appraisal of the internal control system (45.6 percent); independent 
review of the efficient operation of the organization (21.6 percent); and proper 
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safeguarding of assets and preventing and detecting fraud and error (19.2 percent).  
 
The IA role also includes systems development and maintenance (Walker 1996), 
reviewing operating efficiency and effectiveness including internal controls (Fadzil, 
Haron, & Jantan 2005, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006b), fraud investigations and 
special projects (Beasley et al. 2000; Gramling & Myers 2003); and assessing 
compliance with company policies, procedures and statutory requirements (Fadzil et 
al. 2005).  These activities have potential financial implications and so too does the 
risk management responsibility of the IA. Thus, the internal audit has the potential to 
augment the external audit function and reduce the overall monitoring costs.   
 
Before placing reliance on IA work, external auditors assess the IA function including 
IA work quality and scope.  Having unlimited access to IA’s working papers facilitates 
external auditors’ assessment of whether IA work is performed by competent persons.  
Reinstein et al. (1994) find that external auditors access working papers to evaluate IA 
suggestions.  Further, Felix et al. (2001) find the availability and cooperation of the IA 
with the external auditor is associated with IA contribution to the financial statement 
audit.   
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The preceding discussion suggests that the work performed by the IA is negatively 
associated with the degree of external audit effort.  Therefore, we suggest that higher 
level of internal audit effort in performing audit activities will be associated with 
lower external audit fees.  The criterion for determining the contribution of IA work 
performed in reducing external audit fees is related to the following.  First, the 
external auditor’s confidence in the IA work is related to the external auditors’ 
unlimited access to internal auditors’ working papers, as this provides evidence for the 
external auditors to assess the scope and quality of work done by the IA.  Second, 
external auditor reliance on IA work is associated with the time commitment of the IA 
on the activities which reduce risk of materially misstated financial statements and the 
evidence to be collected by the external auditor, which in turn decrease audit fees. The 
IA activities include time spent by the IA on: examining financial statements and 
external audit related matters; systems development and maintenance; reviewing 
operating efficiency and effectiveness including internal controls; fraud investigations 
and special projects; and, assessing compliance with company policies, procedures 
and statutory requirements.  The preceding discussion leads to the following 
propositions:  
 
Proposition 2 (a): There is a negative association between external audit fees and the 
external auditors’ unlimited access to internal auditors’ working 
papers. 
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Proposition 2 (b): There is a negative association between external audit fees and the 
effort spent by internal auditors on examining financial statements 
and external audit related matters.  
 
Proposition 2 (c): There is a negative association between external audit fees and the 
effort spent by internal auditors on systems development and 
maintenance. 
 
Proposition 2 (d): There is a negative association between external audit fees and 
effort spent by internal auditors on reviewing operating efficiency 
and effectiveness including internal controls. 
 
Proposition 2 (e): There is a negative association between external audit fees and 
effort spent by internal auditors on fraud investigations and special 
projects. 
 
Proposition 2 (f): There is a negative association between external audit fees and the 
effort spent by internal auditors on assessing compliance with 
company policies, procedures and statutory requirements. 
 
3. Methodology and model specification   
A survey questionnaire was developed and pilot-tested with five practicing auditors to 
ensure that the questions were appropriate. After incorporating changes, the final 
questionnaire was sent by mail to the chief financial officers of the 200 largest non-
finance sector companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to collect 
information on their internal audit department characteristics and activities for the 
fiscal year ended 20045.  An extract of the questions that appeared in the questionnaire 
                                                 
5  Since it is not a compulsory requirement for listed companies in Hong Kong to establish an IA 
department, only the larger listed companies are likely to have an IA function.  Therefore we sent 
questionnaires to the 200 largest non-finance sector listed firms as these firms are more likely to have 
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that are relevant for this study are reported in Appendix 1.  The variables for testing 
the audit fee model are extracted from the Worldscope database and hand-collected 
from annual reports for the responded firms. The survey was conducted in 2005 and 
the data collected were for the fiscal year ending 2004.   
 
Cross-sectional regression models based on prior audit fee literature are used to test 
the propositions.  All experimental and control variables are first included in the 
regression model to test the propositions. We then take out individual experimental 
variable which does not show a significant association with audit fees to assess the 
impact of its exclusion.  Inclusion of insignificant variables adds unwanted noise into 
the model.   The full model used is specified as below:  
  
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where  
Dependent variable 
LAF = natural logarithm of the external audit fee in Hong Kong dollars 
Experimental variables 
iCHARACIA _  = measure of each of the following two (ith) IA characteristics: 
IASIZE   = natural logarithm of the number of internal audit staff divided by 
total number of employees 
 
                                                                                                                                            
an IA department. Following prior audit fee literature, we exclude the finance industry since many of 
the financial ratios used to estimate audit fees are not relevant to financial institutions (e.g. Simunic 
1980; Francis 1984).  
 
24 
 
  
QUALI   = proportion of internal audit staff having professional 
accounting/auditing qualifications  
 
jACTYIA _   = measure of each of the following six (jth) IA activities: 
ACCWP   = a dummy variable, equals 1 if external auditors have unlimited 
access to all internal auditors’ working papers, and 0 if otherwise 
 
FIN     = proportion of internal audit time spent on financial statements and 
external auditing related matters  
     
OPEFF   = proportion of internal audit time spent on reviewing operating 
efficiency and effectiveness including internal controls 
 
SYSDEV   = proportion of internal audit time spent on systems development and 
maintenance 
 
FRAUD   = proportion of internal audit time spent on fraud investigations & 
other special projects (e.g. due diligence and review) 
 
COMP   = proportion of internal audit time spent on assessing compliance with 
company policies, procedures and statutory requirements 
Control variables 
kCONTROL   = measure of each of the following nine (kth) control variables: 
LTA   = natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV   = total long term debts divided by total assets 
CA    = total current assets less cash divided by total assets 
CR    = total current assets divided by total current liabilities  
BIG4  = a dummy variable, equals 1 if auditors are big 4 firms, and 0 if 
otherwise 
YE  = a dummy variable, equals 1 if fiscal year end is December 31, and 0 
if otherwise 
SUB   = natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries 
ROA   = net income divided by total assets 
LOSS  = a dummy variable, equals 1 if a net loss occurred in the last fiscal 
year, and 0 if otherwise 
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INDl  = an industry dummy variable, equals 1 if a firm belongs to an industry 
l, and 0 if otherwise 
 
The proportion of internal audit staff having professional accounting/auditing 
qualifications (QUALI) and the relative size of the IA department (IASIZE) are used to 
test propositions 1(a) & 1(b) respectively.   For proposition 2(a), we test whether the 
external auditor has unlimited access to internal auditors’ working papers using a 
dummy variable (ACCWP) to determine the association with external audit fees.  
Propositions 2(b) to 2(f), which test the contribution of relative IA time spent on 
different activities in reducing external audit fees, are operationalized by the variables 
FIN, SYSDEV, OPEFF, FRAUD and COMP respectively.  The coefficients for all the 
experimental variables are expected to be negative, since the IA characteristics and 
activities under examination contribute to reducing external audit effort and hence 
lower audit fees.      
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley 2002; Gul, 
Chen, & Tsui  2003; Simunic 1980), control variables are included to reduce the 
possibility that the experimental variables proxy for other cross-sectional 
determinants of audit fees.  The natural logarithm of total assets (LTA) controls for 
26 
 
  
higher audit fees charged for larger firms and leverage (LEV) controls for risk 
associated with highly leveraged firms.  A positive association is expected for the 
above control variables and audit fee.  The ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
(CR) is included as a measure of short-term financial risk, and a negative association 
is expected with audit fee.  Return on assets (ROA) for the current year is included to 
control for the effect of firm performance and a negative association is expected.  A 
dichotomous variable LOSS which equals one for firms reporting losses during the 
previous fiscal year is included to measure client-specific litigation risks to be borne 
by auditors, and a positive association is expected.   
 
We control for cross-sectional differences in risky balance sheet components such as 
receivables and inventories among different auditees by including total non-cash 
current assets scaled by total assets (CA) and expect the coefficient to be positive.   
The natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries (SUB) is used to control for client 
complexity and risk.  In addition, increased subsidiaries are usually associated with 
greater decentralization, which leads to higher demand for monitoring; hence we 
expect a positive coefficient.  A dummy variable BIG4 is included and a positive 
coefficient is expected as prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors are able to charge 
a fee premium for higher quality and brand name.  We also control for higher audit 
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fees charged for peak season when most clients have their fiscal year ends 
concentrated in December.  Finally, industry dummies are included to control for 
variation across different industries.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Response rate 
As reported in Panel A of Table 1, a total of 74 companies responded to the survey, 
which represents a response rate of 37 percent.  After excluding 11 companies with no 
internal audit department, and 10 companies which gave significantly incomplete 
responses, there was a total of 53 usable responses, representing a 26.5 percent usable 
response rate.  A distribution of the respondents by industry is presented in Panel B of 
Table 1.  The majority of the respondents (66%) are industrial companies6, followed 
by property firms (17%), then transportation (9%) and lastly utility companies (8%).   
(Table 1 here) 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the model variables.  The mean and median 
audit fees for the sample companies for 2004 is HK$2.8 million and HK$1.6 million 
respectively7 .  The mean and median number of IA staff employed is 6 and 3 
                                                 
6 These also include consolidated enterprises since the Worldscope database classifies such companies 
as industrials.  
7 The average exchange rate for the HK dollars to the US dollar for December 2004, the date of the 
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respectively (not reported in Table 2), which gives the proportion of internal audit 
staff to total employees a mean of 0.5% and a median of 0.25%.  On average, 58% of 
the internal auditors in the sample possess professional accounting and/or auditing 
qualifications.  More than half of the firms (57%) provide unlimited access of their 
internal auditors’ working papers to external auditors8 .  Regarding IA activities, 
respondents on average spend most of their time (29%) on reviewing the operational 
efficiency and effectiveness of the firms.  The next most frequently conducted activity 
is assessing compliance with company policies, procedures and statutory requirements 
(22%), followed by financial statements and external auditing related matters (19%), 
systems development and maintenance (12%), and fraud/special investigations (12%).  
The remaining 6% of IA time was spent on other miscellaneous matters, which the 
respondents did not specify.    
(Table 2 here) 
 
The remaining variables in Table 2 indicate the economic characteristics of firms in 
the sample.  Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix of the regression variables.  
Consistent with the hypothesized relationship, LAF is significantly negatively 
correlated with IASIZE and FIN.  However, contrary to the proposition, LAF is 
                                                                                                                                            
annual reports, is 0.1286. 
8 Since the scope of internal auditing function is much wider than that of external auditing, some 
companies may not wish to provide external auditors unlimited access to all of its working files, some 
of which might contain confidential information irrelevant to the external auditing function.   
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significantly positively correlated with OPEFF and COMP, while no significant 
correlation with other experimental variables is observed.  The correlations of LAF 
with most control variables are significant and in the expected directions, except for 
ROA and LOSS, which are in the opposite directions. 
(Table 3 here) 
 
4.3. Regression results 
Regression results presented in Table 4 are obtained after winsorizing all continuous 
variables by the top and bottom 1% to control for the effects of outliers.  The White 
(1980) corrected test is used to control for possible heteroskedasticity.  We first 
regress LAF on all experimental variables and control variables together with the 
industry dummy variables.  Since the proportion of time spent on each IA activity 
totals 100%, this variable are highly correlated, as reported in Table 3, and 
simultaneously including the major categories of activities as experimental variables 
in the regression creates multi-collinearity problems.  Consistent with this fact, we 
find high variance inflation factors with the parameter estimates of IA activities. We 
therefore take out one IA activity, COMP, which is least relevant to the external 
auditors among the major IA activities and estimate the regression. As reported under 
M1 of Table 4, lower audit fees is associated with larger IA departments, unlimited 
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access to IA working papers by external auditors, and more IA effort spent on 
financial and external audit matters, assessment of operating efficiency and 
effectiveness including internal controls, systems development and maintenance, and 
fraud   investigations (p<0.01 for ACCWP, FIN and SYSDEV; p<0.05 for IASIZE, 
OPEFF and FRAUD).  The adjusted R2 is 86 percent.  Although insignificant, the 
coefficient for QUALI is negative as predicted.  These results show support for most 
of the propositions.  Since there is a relatively large size of regressors compared with 
the sample size, the experimental variable, QUALI, which is insignificant in M1, is 
excluded and the regression is re-estimated.  The results are reported under M2 in 
Table 4 and are qualitatively similar to those for M1.  The explanatory power of the 
two models remains consistent at 86%.    Finally, the regression is re-estimated with 
all the insignificant experimental and control variables excluded.  The results, 
reported under M3 in Table 4, are qualitatively similar to those for M1 and M2, and 
the adjusted R-square is increased slightly by 1 percent to 87%. 
 (Table 4 here) 
 
In summary, the results suggest that lower external audit fees are associated with 
larger relative IA staff size, external auditors’ having unlimited access to IA working 
papers, and more IA effort spent on major activities performed, which include 
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financial and external audit matters, systems development and maintenance, fraud 
investigations, and assessment of operating efficiency and effectiveness including 
internal controls.  The insignificant result for QUALI may be explained by the study 
by Krishnamoorthy (2002), who finds that external auditors place less importance on 
IA competence (proxied by professional certification and experience) if they find 
strong evidence of satisfactory work performance by IA.   
 
Finally, the regression coefficients for the control variables are in the predicted 
directions, except for CR and LOSS.   However, our findings for CR and LOSS are 
also consistent with some prior studies.  For example, Carcello et al. (2005) present 
competing arguments that financial characteristics such as liquidity and profitability 
reflect elements of both company risk and ability to pay for monitoring through 
auditing.  Consequently, they do not make directional expectations for those variables.   
Following their argument, CR and LOSS may have a positive or negative association 
with audit fee.   Our findings of a positive (negative) coefficient on CR (LOSS) 
support the argument for the firm’s ability to pay for enhanced monitoring through 
auditing.   Similar to the findings in this study, DeFond, Francis, & Wong (2000) 
report a negative insignificant coefficient on LOSS for their examination of Big 6 fee 
premiums for both general brand name and for industry specialization in the Hong 
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Kong market.   As discussed respectively in Sections 3 and 2.1 above, LOSS measures 
client-specific litigation risks to be borne by auditors but Hong Kong auditors are 
likely to perceive low litigation risks associated with their engagements, compared 
with their US counterparts.   Therefore the results for Hong Kong studies may differ 
from other US studies.  
 
5.  Additional Analyses 
5.1. Corporate governance 
Some corporate governance variables are identified from the annual reports of the 
firms in the sample and included in the regressions.  The variables include the 
percentage of outside (non-executive and independent) directors on the board and the 
percentage of financial experts on the audit committee.   When these two variables are 
included in the regressions (N=509), the results remain qualitatively unchanged except 
that the association of audit fees with IA department size (IASIZE) is not significant.  
The coefficients for the percentage of outside directors and the percentage of financial 
experts are negative and significant at p<0.05, with adjusted R-square increases 
slightly to 88%. These results suggest that even after controlling for corporate 
governance variables concerning board and audit committee characteristics, the 
                                                 
9 The sample size is reduced to 50 from 53 because data on those two variables are missing from some 
annual reports. 
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reported results still hold in general.       
 
5.2. Relative impact of IA activities on external audit fees 
To enhance our understanding of the impact of IA activities on external audit fees, we 
examine if some activities lower audit fees more than others.  We assess the relative 
impact by testing whether the estimated coefficients on the time spent on different IA 
activities are significantly different from each other, using the Chi-square test.  We 
find differences significant at p<0.1 (two-tailed) among some of the activities.  IA 
time spent on financial statements matters and systems development, respectively, 
reduces external audit fees more significantly than time spent on reviewing operating 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Such results are consistent with the former activities 
being more important and directly relevant to the external audit work than the latter 
activity.  
 
5.3. Alternative variable measurement 
As an alternative measurement of IA staff qualifications, we use the natural logarithm 
of the number of internal audit staff with professional accounting/auditing 
qualifications and find a similar insignificant coefficient (not reported here) for the 
reported regression.  Following Messier & Schneider (1988), we also test if IA work 
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experience contributes to competence and helps reduce external audit effort and fees.  
We find no significant association with audit fees. 
 
5.4. Late response biases 
To test if the results are affected by late response bias, we divide the sample into the 
early response group (n=29) and late response group (responded at least one month 
later than the earliest respondent, n=24).  A t-test is used to examine if there is any 
significant difference between the mean value of each regression variable between the 
two groups.  No significant differences exist between the two groups (results not 
reported here), except that the late response group on average has a higher ratio of 
total debts to total assets (LEV).  We also include in the regressions a dummy variable 
with the value of 1 for the late response group, and 0 for the early response group, and 
the results remain qualitatively the same. 
 
5.5.  Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
When putting conservatism in practice, accountants tend to require a higher degree of 
verification to recognize good news as gains in financial statements than to recognize 
bad news as losses (Basu 1997).  Through its asymmetrical verifiability requirement, 
conservatism serves as an efficient financial reporting mechanism to constrain 
35 
 
  
managerial opportunistic behavior and offset managerial biases in reporting 
accounting measures used in contracting (Watts 2003).   Based on the bonding 
argument discussed earlier in Section 2, we anticipate that firms with internal auditing 
function would have better accounting information quality and disclosure to provide 
credible signals to the market and minority shareholders.   Hence these firms would 
likely adopt more conservative accounting and have more timely recognition of losses 
than earnings.  To further provide evidence to support our arguments that internal 
auditing helps mitigate Type II agency problems and enhances financial reporting 
quality, tests on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings are conducted on the sample 
firms.   
Following Basu (1997), we regress earnings per share, X, on contemporaneous annual 
returns, R.   To control for possible heteroskedasticity, earnings per share are deflated 
by the opening stock price, P.   Moreover White (1980) t-statistics are used.   Buy-
and-hold annual returns are calculated to end three or four months after the fiscal year 
end to ensure that market responses to the previous year’s earnings are excluded 
(Easton & Harris 1991).10   The asymmetric effect of conservatism on accounting for 
good news and bad news is tested by the use of a dummy variable, DR, to take on the 
                                                 
10 The Listing Rules in Hong Kong requires listed companies to announce and publish their annual 
financial results within four months after the fiscal year end.  Since firms in our sample made such 
announcement within three or four months after the fiscal year end, we use two measures of annual 
returns, one calculated to end three months, and the other calculated to end four months after the fiscal 
year end.  
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value of one if annual returns are negative, and zero if otherwise, see test model (2) 
below.   
Since stock prices reflect information other than current earnings, stock prices lead 
accounting earnings by up to four years (see e.g., Ball and Brown 1968; Kothari and 
Sloan 1992).  Conservatism results in more timely recognition of bad news in reported 
earnings than good news.  Thus earnings are predicted to be more strongly and 
positively associated with concurrent negative returns, which proxy for bad news, 
than positive returns, which proxy for good news.  Following Basu (1997), we specify 
the leading variable returns as the independent variable and the lagging variable 
earnings as the dependent variable in the following test model:        
iiiiiii DRRRDRPX   */ 1010     (2) 
Panel A of Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on the model variables.   The mean 
and median opening price deflated earnings per share is 0.10 and 0.09 respectively.  
The mean and median return dummy is 0.30 and 0 respectively. The mean and median 
annual returns calculated to end three months after the fiscal year end is 0.33 and 0.22 
respectively.  The mean and median interaction variable R*DR is -0.07 and 0 
respectively.11 
                                                 
11 Descriptive statistics for annual returns calculated to end four months after the fiscal year end and the 
corresponding dummy variable and interaction variable are qualitatively similar and are not tabulated 
in Table 5 for simplicity.  
 
37 
 
  
Panel B and Panel C report cross-sectional regression results for price deflated 
earnings on annual returns calculated to end three months and four months 
respectively after the fiscal year end.   Regression results are obtained after deleting 
the lowest and highest values of the observations for opening price deflated earnings, 
X/P, and returns, R, to reduce the effects of outliers.   It results in 50 and 49 
observations respectively for Panel B and Panel C since some observations have price 
deflated earnings and returns falling in the same extreme ranking.   As expected, the 
intercept and coefficients on returns and the interaction variable R*DR are positive 
and significant.   As reported in Panel B, adjusted 2R  is 17% for M1 and 22% for M2 
respectively.    They are higher than the reported 7.99% and 10.09% respectively in 
Basu (1997), suggesting that reported earnings of firms with internal auditing function 
are more explainable by (credible) market news.   M2 uses a dummy variable, DR, to 
divide firms into “good news” and “bad news” observations.  The interactive slope 
coefficient, 1  measures the difference in sensitivity of earnings to positive and 
negative returns.  It is significant and implies that earnings is about six times 
[(0.09+0.47)/0.09 = 6.2] as sensitive to negative returns as it is to positive returns.   
This multiple is higher than that reported in Basu (1997), which is 4.66.  Separate 
regressions on the positive and negative returns sub-samples reveal that the 
explanatory power of negative returns (adjusted 2R = 30% for 14 firms) is greater 
38 
 
  
than positive returns (6% for 36 firms).    
 
When annual returns are calculated to end four months after the fiscal year end, as 
reported in Panel C, the adjusted 2R  for all regressions are higher than in Panel B.  
The slope coefficient on negative returns is about five times [(0.11+0.42)/0.11=4.82] 
that on positive returns.  The explanatory power of negative returns sub-sample, 35% 
for 33 firms, exceeds that of positive returns sub-sample, 11% for 16 firms.   To 
summarize, the above findings are consistent with earnings being more timely or 
concurrently sensitive in reporting publicly available “bad news” than “good news”, 
which in turn support our arguments that firms with internal auditing function would 
have better accounting information quality and disclosure.  
(Table 5 here) 
 
6. Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate that certain IA characteristics and work performed 
are significant determinants of external audit fees.  Specifically, in terms of IA 
characteristics, larger internal audit departments are associated with lower audit fees.  
Work performed by the IA is related to significantly lower audit fees where internal 
auditors spend more time on examining financial statements and external audit related 
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matters, on systems development and maintenance, on fraud investigations and, on 
reviewing operating efficiency and effectiveness including internal controls, and when 
internal auditors give unlimited access of their working papers to external auditors.   
 
This study helps to clarify some of the inconsistencies of prior studies and provides 
further evidence to support the linkage between external audit fees and internal audit 
characteristics and activities.  The results of this study suggest that IA contribution 
may substitute for some substantive external auditing processes and is associated with 
lowering Type II agency costs by incurring bonding costs and providing better 
accounting information quality and disclosure.  Therefore, this study provides support 
to the international auditing standards requirement of external auditors assessing the 
activities of internal auditing and their impact on external audit procedures, and on the 
co-ordination of external and internal audit work. This study determines IA 
involvement in the external audit process and the nature of that involvement by 
assessing the relative significance of each of the IA activities on the audit fee in an 
institutional setting dominated by Type II agency problems where there is 
concentrated ownership and majority-minority shareholder conflict.  In addition, the 
findings are consistent with the cultural argument of Kachelmeier & Shehata (1997) 
on collectivists versus individualists and the expectation that external auditors in 
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Hong Kong can place greater reliance on the activities performed by the internal 
auditors and subsequently charge lower fees.  This study augments the emerging 
research on the increasing monitoring role of the IA since it determines IA 
involvement in the external audit process and the nature of that involvement.  Future 
research may investigate whether IA involvement in the financial statement audit 
results in higher quality governance, and hence, higher quality financial reporting. 
 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, there are only 53 useable responses 
and the results may be unique to these firms.  Second, the results are for the year 2004.  
Third, our results are obtained in Hong Kong.  These three factors limit the ability to 
generalize the results across firms, years and countries.  Finally, we focus on a few 
aspects of internal audit department characteristics and activities. Clearly there may 
be other aspects of the internal audit unit that could affect the results, such as, the 
seniority and expertise of the head and staff of the internal audit unit and the degree of 
independence of internal auditors.  These factors could affect the quality and 
objectivity of internal audit work and hence the degree of reliance on IA work by 
external auditors. Despite these limitations, the evidence reported here provides some 
preliminary evidence that a firm’s internal audit function is associated with the 
external auditor’s assessment of audit risk and hence audit effort and fees.   
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Table 1 
 Sample description 
 
Panel A: Sample determination Number
Listed companies  200
Responding companies 74
Companies without an internal audit department (11)
Incomplete responses  (10)
Usable responses 53
 
Panel B: Sample industry distribution (n=53) 
Industrial 35
Properties 9
Transportation 5
Utilities 4
 53
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Table 2 
 Descriptive statistics for 53 firms for year 2004 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum
AF 2.79 3.05 0.65 1.58 15.29
LAF 14.39 0.99 11.08 14.27 16.54 
IARATIO 0.005 0.006 0.0001 0.0025 0.02
IASIZE -6.06 1.34 -9.21 -5.99 -3.91
QUALI 0.58 0.37 0.00 0.63 1.00 
ACCWP 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FIN 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.15 0.80 
OPEFF 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.30 0.70 
SYSDEV 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.60 
FRAUD 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.35 
COMP 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.70
TA 12,222 20,603 37 2,387 110,962
LTA 21.90 1.79 17.42 21.59 25.43 
LEV 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.51 
CA 0.30 0.19 0.01 0.31 0.84 
CR 2.13 1.47 0.36 1.62 7.91 
BIG4 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 
YE 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SUB 3.11 0.87 0.00 3.09 4.71
ROA 0.05 0.09 -0.25 0.05 0.24 
LOSS 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Variable definition: 
AF = external audit fee in millions of Hong Kong dollars 
LAF = natural logarithm of the external audit fee  
IARATIO = number of internal audit staff divided by total number of employees 
IASIZE = natural logarithm of the number of internal audit staff divided by total 
number of employees 
QUALI = proportion of internal audit staff having professional accounting/auditing 
qualifications 
ACCWP = a dummy variable, equals 1 if external auditors have unlimited access to all 
internal auditors’ working papers, and 0 if otherwise 
FIN = proportion of internal audit time spent on financial statement and external 
auditing related matters      
OPEFF = proportion of internal audit time spent on reviewing operating efficiency 
and effectiveness including internal controls 
SYSDEV = proportion of internal audit time spent on systems development and 
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maintenance 
FRAUD = proportion of internal audit time spent on fraud investigations & other 
special projects (e.g., due diligence, review) 
COMP = proportion of internal audit time spent on assessing compliance with 
company policies, procedures and statutory requirements  
TA = total assets in millions of Hong Kong dollars 
LTA = natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV = total long term debts divided by total assets 
CA = total non-cash current assets divided by total assets 
CR = total current assets divided by total current liabilities  
BIG4 = a dummy variable, equals 1 if auditors are big 4 firms, and 0 if otherwise 
YE = a dummy variable, equals 1 if fiscal year end is December 31, and 0 if otherwise 
SUB = natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries 
ROA = net income divided by total assets 
LOSS = a dummy variable, equals 1 if a net loss occurred in the last fiscal year, and 0 
if otherwise 
 
Note: 
proportion of firms that provide IA working paper access to the external auditor =0.57 
proportion of firms audited by a Big4 auditor = 0.81 
proportion of firms with fiscal year end of December 31 = 0.68 
proportion of firms where a net loss occurred in the last fiscal year = 0.08
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Table 3   
Pearson Correlation Matrix (N=53) 
 IASIZE QUALI ACCWP FIN OPEFF SYSDEV FRAUD COMP LTA LEV CA CR BIG4 YE SUB ROA LOSS 
LAF -0.40*** 0.14 0.06 -0.33** 0.31** 0.01 -0.16 0.32** 0.82*** 0.31** -0.15 -0.28** 0.52*** -0.03 0.74*** 0.35*** -0.53*** 
IASIZE  -0.19 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.19 -0.00 -0.04 0.29** -0.21 0.26* -0.19 -0.29** 0.23* 
QUALI   0.00 0.12 0.16 -0.05 -0.09 -0.22 0.24* 0.15 -0.18 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.15 0.00 0.07 
ACCWP      -0.15 0.26* -0.02 -0.28** -0.01 0.24* -0.03 0.09 0.26* 0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.11 
FIN        -0.45*** -0.37*** -0.13 -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.06 0.07 0.17 -0.30 -0.01 -0.12 -0.21 0.18 
OPEFF         -0.17 -0.32** -0.12 0.36*** 0.25* -0.05 -0.11 0.26* -0.15 0.26* 0.01 0.12 
SYSDEV           -0.06 0.09 0.10 -0.19 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.19 -0.12 0.29** -0.19 
FRAUD             -0.27** -0.18 0.00 -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.12 
COMP        0.26* 0.06 -0.01 -0.10 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.17 -0.23* 
LTA               0.44*** -0.33** -0.27* 0.50*** 0.12 0.61*** 0.27* -0.39*** 
LEV                  -0.43*** -0.29** 0.13 0.08 0.29** 0.09 -0.06 
CA                    0.11 -0.08 -0.44*** 0.06 0.11 -0.16 
CR                      -0.06 -0.01 -0.30** -0.24* 0.17 
BIG4                        0.08 0.25* 0.24* -0.41*** 
YE                          -0.20 -0.23* 0.20 
SUB                            0.36*** -0.44*** 
ROA                               -0.55*** 
*** significant at p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
**  significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
*  significant at p < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
Please refer to Table 2 for variable definition.  
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Table 4  
Regression results with White (1980) corrected t-values in parentheses.  Dependent variable:  
LAF (N=53) 
  Expected Sign M1 M2 M3
INTERCEPT ? 5.74*** 6.00*** 5.84***
   (5.97) (6.49) (6.96)
IASIZE - -0.08** -0.07** -0.08**
   (-1.71) (-1.68) (-1.69)
QUALI - -0.10
   (-0.87)
ACCWP - -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.24***
  (-2.55) (-2.50) (-2.82)
FIN - -1.54*** -1.64*** -1.52***
   (-3.01) (-3.22) (-3.32)
OPEFF - -0.93** -1.01** -0.94**
   (-1.74) (-1.87) (-2.00)
SYSDEV - -1.85*** -1.93*** -1.84***
   (-2.83) (-2.95) (-2.98)
FRAUD - -1.45** -1.51** -1.32**
   (-2.02) (-2.11) (-2.06)
LTA + 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.29***
   (6.08) (5.75) (5.97)
LEV + 0.46 0.50
   (1.13) (1.23)
CA + 0.04 0.06
   (0.19) (0.27)
CR - 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
   (3.31) (3.28) (3.30)
BIG4 + 0.24** 0.26** 0.28**
   (2.05) (2.10) (2.31)
YE + 0.22** 0.24** 0.24**
   (2.16) (2.32) (2.26)
SUB + 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.55***
   (7.48) (7.43) (7.04)
ROA - -0.19 -0.14
   (-0.30) (-0.23)
LOSS + -0.06 -0.08
   (-0.28) (-0.37)
Adj. R-Sq.  0.86 0.86 0.87
Note 1:   The results are obtained after controlling for industry differences using industry dummies (their 
coefficients & t-statistics are not reported here).  Please refer to Table 2 for variable definition.  
Note 2:  Since there is a relatively large number of regressors compared with the sample size, QUALI, which is 
insignificant in M1, is excluded and the regression is re-estimated in M2.  Furthermore, all insignificant 
independent variables are excluded and the regression is re-estimated  in M3. 
***  significant at p < 0.01 (one-tailed);    **   significant at p < 0.05 (one-tailed)   
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Table 5  
Panel A.  Descriptive statistics for earnings-returns tests of 53 firms for 2004  
Variable Mean ST Dev Min. Median Max. 
X/P   0.10 0.17 -0.32 0.09 0.82 
DR 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
R 0.33 0.90 -0.64 0.22 5.96 
R*DR -0.07 0.15 -0.64 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Panel B.  Regression results with annual returns calculated to end three months after fiscal year 
end.   Dependent variable: X/P  
  Expected Sign M1 M2 Positive returns  Negative returns 
Intercept + 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.14***
  (3.35) (4.24) (4.24) (3.45)
DR ? 0.07  
  (1.51)  
R + 0.13*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.56**
  (2.64) (1.76) (1.69) (2.38)
R*DR + 0.47**  
  (2.30)  
Adj. R-Sq. 0.17 0.22 0.06 0.30 
Sample size 50 50 36 14
 
 
Panel C.  Regression results with annual returns calculated to end four months after fiscal year 
end.   Dependent variable: X/P  
  Expected Sign M1 M2 Positive returns Negative returns 
Intercept + 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11***
  (3.22) (3.36) (3.61) (3.02)
DR ? 0.02  
  (0.42)  
R + 0.17*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.53***
  (2.49) (2.07) (2.23) (4.38)
R*DR + 0.42***  
  (2.6)  
Adj. R-Sq   0.29 0.36 0.11 0.35 
Sample size   49 49 33 16
 
*** significant at p < 0.01 (one-tailed);  ** significant at p < 0.05 (one-tailed);  White (1980) corrected t-values 
are in parentheses;  X/P = opening price deflated earnings per share; R = annual returns calculated to end three or 
four months after fiscal year end (note: reported in Panel A are for returns ending three months after the fiscal year 
end);  DR = a dummy variable, equals 1 if annual returns are negative, and 0 if otherwise;  R*DR = interaction 
variable of R and DR 
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Appendix 1 
Abstract of the Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
Respondents were asked to provide information for the financial year of 2004 regarding the 
following questions:   
 
1.  What is the approximate number of full-time employees in your whole organization?  
 
 ___________________ 
 
2. State the total number of staff in your in-house (internal) audit section/unit.  _________ 
 
 
3. How many of these staff identified in Question (2) have recognized accounting/auditing 
qualifications (e.g., IIA, HKICPA, ACCA, CA, CISA, CPA Australia, etc.)? __________ 
 
 
4. Do the external auditors have unlimited access to all the internal auditors’ working papers? 
       Yes 
 No 
 
 
5.  What approximate percentage of internal audit time was spent in the following activities in 
the financial year ended in 2004? 
 
Financial statements and external auditing related matters   ____% 
Operating efficiency and effectiveness including internal controls  ____% 
System development and maintenance including IT-based systems  ____% 
Fraud investigations & other special projects  
(e.g., due diligence, review)       ____% 
Compliance with company policies, procedures and statutory  
requirements         ____% 
Others, pl. specify: __________       ____% 
 100 % 
 
 
 
